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THE PRIMACY OF DEMOCRACY OVER
NATURAL LAW IN IRISH ABORTION LAW: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE C CASE
I.  INTRODUCTION
A line of recent Irish abortion decisions illustrates that natural
law is being displaced in Irish jurisprudence by democratic principles.
The Preamble of the Irish Constitution captures the Constitution’s
staunchly Roman Catholic nature when it begins, “[i]n the name of
the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as
our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred.”1
The Preamble has also been understood to embrace a Catholic natu-
ral law philosophy.  As a further example of the embodiment of natu-
ral law in the Irish Constitution, consider Article 41, which explicitly
recognizes that the family possesses “inalienable and imprescriptible
rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.”2  From the adop-
tion of the Irish Constitution in 1937 until recently, the Irish judiciary
consistently recognized and upheld the influence of Catholic natural
law in  interpreting the Constitution.
Some Irish courts, however, have begun to undermine the force
and dominance of natural law theory in Irish jurisprudence.  Due in
large part to the failure of the government to legislate on the highly
sensitive issue of abortion, judges have increasingly ignored the man-
dates of Catholic natural law in favor of outcomes which support the
liberalizing trend in Irish political theory and practice.  This trend be-
gan with the X case in 1992.3  The X case considered whether a four-
teen-year-old rape victim could have a legal abortion, despite the
Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution guaranteeing the right
to life of the unborn.  The justification that the Court cited to allow
the young girl to receive an abortion was not viable under Catholic
1. IR. CONST. pmbl.
2. Id. art. 41.1.1.
3. Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir. S.C.).
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natural law.  The trend continued and intensified in 1995, when the
Supreme Court explicitly held that natural law was neither superior
nor antecedent to the Constitution and that the Constitution itself
was the supreme source of law in Ireland.  The Court also held that
the people of Ireland were free to amend the Constitution in a man-
ner contrary to natural law.  The Court thereby not only provided a
devastating blow to the standing of natural law, but also provided for
the primacy of the democratic process in providing the supreme
source of law in Ireland.
The C case, which is the focus of this Note, continued the trend
of disavowing a natural law influence on the Irish Constitution.  The
C case, like the X case, involved a young teenage girl, pregnant as a
result of rape.  Like the X case, the court in the C case permitted the
young girl to have an abortion, but went further in its holding by
permitting a state agency to fund and facilitate the young girl’s abor-
tion.
This Note begins by examining the facts of the C case, and then
gives a brief overview of the development of abortion law in Ireland
prior to the case.  The C case is then analyzed with respect to its
holdings concerning the status of suicide as a qualifying risk to the
life of the mother, the rights of parents of pregnant minors, and the
role of the Irish State in allowing, funding, or otherwise facilitating
abortions either inside or outside its jurisdiction.  The case analysis
also includes a brief look at the possible consequences of the C case
holding.  The Note concludes with a brief discussion of the urgent
need for legislation in a number of areas relevant to shaping the fu-
ture of abortion law in Ireland.
II. C CASE FACTS
The C case involved a horrific set of facts.  Miss C, a thirteen-
year-old girl, was brutally raped on August 27, 1997, allegedly by a
long standing friend of the family, and became pregnant as a result.4
C, one of twelve children, belonged to the Travelling community.5
She and her family lived in particularly squalid conditions, even by
Traveller standards.6  The State felt that C’s parents did not respond
4. See A and B v. Eastern Health Board, Judge Fahy and C, and the Attorney General
(notice party) [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 469 (Ir. H. Ct.) [hereinafter C case].
5. See id.  Irish Travellers are an indigenous minority with a distinctive lifestyle and cul-
ture based on a nomadic tradition.  See generally Pavee Point Travellers’ Centre, Traveller
Facts (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://www.iol.ie/~pavee/irish.htm>.
6. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. at 469.  A survey in 1994 reported that among Travellers
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appropriately to their daughter’s rape, and as a result, C was placed
in the care of the Eastern Health Board (EHB) with the consent of
her parents.7  C was subsequently placed by the EHB with a foster
family.  These custody arrangements, made under the authority of an
interim care order, were renewed on a weekly basis in district court.8
C was distraught over the pregnancy and at all times professed a
desire to obtain an abortion.9  The High Court explained that she “is
quite unable to relate to the baby inside her and cannot accept and
claims that she will never accept that that baby is really hers.”10
Early reports stated that C’s parents were supportive of the girl’s
decision to have an abortion.11  Lawyers for the EHB and C’s parents
had even reached an agreement to remove C from EHB care to fa-
cilitate her traveling to England in order to obtain an abortion.12  This
agreement, however, fell apart on the night of November 18, and C’s
parents appeared at the district court the next day with prominent
anti-abortion campaigners.13  That morning, C’s parents unexpectedly
announced that they no longer supported their daughter’s wish to
terminate her pregnancy.14  Rumors surfaced that the anti-abortion
53% had no access to public electricity, 28% had no toilets, 53% had no showers, and 100%
had no public phones on site.  See generally Pavee Point Travellers’ Centre, Traveller Facts:
Accomodation and Living Conditions (visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://www.iol.ie/
~pavee/fsaccom.htm>.
7. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. at 469-70; see also Chronology of Events, IR. TIMES, Nov.
24, 1997, at 6.  A child may be placed in the care of a health board under the authority of Sec-
tion 17 of the Child Care Act, No. 17 (1991).  In order to grant such an order, the district court
judge must be satisfied that there is reasonable cause to believe that any of the circumstances
set out in Section 18(1)(a), (b), or (c) is occurring.  These circumstances include a child being
assaulted, ill-treated, neglected or sexually abused; a child’s health, development or welfare
having been or being avoidably impaired or neglected or the child’s health, development or
welfare being likely to be avoidably impaired or neglected.  The Section provides that a child
may be placed in care for a period not exceeding eight days or where the parents consent for a
longer period of time.  Such care orders are temporary in nature, although extension of the or-
der may be sought.  See id. sec. 18(1)(a), (b), & (c).
8. See Chronology of Events, supra note 7.  Renewals of interim care orders may be
granted where the district court judge is satisfied that the grounds for an interim care order
continue to exist.  See Child Care Act § 17(2)(b) & cmts.
9. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 470 (Ir. H. Ct.).
10. Id.
11. See Chronology of Events, supra note 7.
12. See Paul Cullen, New Legal Team Expected for Rape Victim’s Parents, IR. TIMES, Nov.
21, 1997, at 9.
13. See Geraldine Kennedy & Paul Cullen, Attempt to Remove Girl Rape Victim From
EHB Care Fails.  Parents Accompanied to Court by Anti-Abortion Campaigners, IR. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1997, at 1.
14. See id.; see also Paul Cullen, Youth Group Seen as Cutting Edge of the Anti-Abortion
Cause, IR. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1997, at 9.
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groups involved had offered the parents a significant amount of
money for the opportunity to use C’s situation for publicity.15  The
groups involved strongly denied such rumors, although they did in-
vest a large amount of money to support the legal rights of the par-
ents, who had previously utilized a state-provided attorney.16  Before
discussing the court room developments of the C case, it is necessary
to take a brief look at the development of abortion law in Ireland
prior to the case.
III. ABORTION LAW IN IRELAND
A. The Constitution
The Irish Constitution (Bunreacht na hÉireann) embodies the in-
fluence of the Catholic philosopher and theologian St. Thomas Aqui-
nas, who believed the State was a means of instituting God’s eternal
law on earth and that true justice can only be attained within the
framework of Catholic morality.17  The Preamble to the Constitution,
as well as sections of Articles 40 and 41, exalt God as the ultimate
lawgiver and clearly display the moral, social, and political teachings
of the Catholic tradition.18  The Constitution was written by Eamon
de Valera and adopted in 1937, at a time when Catholic identity was
critical to the Irish State and the Irish people in the wake of their in-
dependence from Protestant Great Britain.19
The Constitution contained no explicit prohibition of abortion
prior to the adoption of the Eighth Amendment in 1983.20  Despite
this lack of a specific prohibition of abortion, many scholars believe
that even prior to the Eighth Amendment the Constitution protected
15. Cf. Cullen, supra note 12.
16. See id.
17. See Paul W. Butler & David L. Gregory, A Not so Distant Mirror: Federalism and the
Role of Natural Law in the United States, the Republic of Ireland, and the European Commu-
nity, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429, 446-47 (1992).
18. See id. at 445-46; see also IR. CONST. arts. 40, 41.
19. Even today over 90% of the population of Ireland is Roman Catholic.  See Ireland, in
CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 193 (1994).  However, various sources have suggested a decrease in
the influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland.  See Fiachra Gibbons, Slow Bleed from Rome,
THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 5, 1995, at 21, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File; Mary
Kenny, No More Power, No More Glory, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 13, 1997 at 2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File; John Mullin, Rebel Irish Catholic Bishop Ordains Mother
as First Woman Priest: John Mullin on a Bizarre Challenge to Church Hierarchy, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 15, 1998, at 9.
20. See JAMES KINGSTON ET AL., ABORTION AND THE LAW 2 (1997).
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the right to life of the unborn.21  Several judges agreed with this view
in dicta, expressing the opinion that Article 40.3 prohibited abor-
tion.22  However, no Irish court was called on to actually decide the
issue.23
B. Criminal Law
Abortion has always been illegal in Ireland, both at common law
and under statutory law.24  The Offenses Against the Person Act of
1861 is the current criminal law statute pertaining to abortion.25  Sec-
tion 58 of the Act makes self-induced abortion (or attempted self-
induced abortion) a felony punishable by life imprisonment.26  Sec-
tion 59 of the Act makes the assistance in an abortion or the supply
of an abortifacient a misdemeanor.27  More recently, the Health
(Family Planning) Act of 197928 specifically reaffirmed the acceptance
by the Oireachtas29 of Sections 58 and 59 of the Offenses Against the
Person Act.30  However, there has never been a criminal prosecution
21. The belief was based on the assumption that under a constitution written in the Catho-
lic natural law tradition, the right to life of the unborn was a fundamental right, which although
not enumerated in the Constitution was nonetheless protected by the document’s protection of
fundamental, inalienable personal rights.  See IR. CONST. art. 40.  Many also interpret the terms
“person” and “citizen” to include the unborn, since under Catholic theory the unborn is a per-
son worthy of protection from the moment of conception.  See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH ¶ 2274 (1995) [hereinafter CATECHISM].
22. See KINGSTON ET AL., supra note 20; see also Liam Hamilton, Matters of Life and
Death, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 549 (1996).  Article 40.3, prior to the inclusion of the Eighth
Amendment, stated, “The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by
its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.  The State shall, in particular,
by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate
the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen.”  IR. CONST. art. 40.3.
23. See KINGSTON ET AL., supra note 20.
24. See Kristin E. Carder, Liberalizing Abortion in Ireland: In re Article 26 and the Passage
of the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies)
Bill, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 255 (1996).
25. See The Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100 (Ir.).
26. See id. sec. 58.
27. See id. sec. 59.
28. See the Health (Family Planning) Act, No. 20 (1979).
29. Oireachtas is the term for the Irish legislature, which is comprised of two houses, the
Dáil Éireann and the Seanad Éireann.
30. See Hamilton, supra note 22, at 550.  Section 10 of the Health (Family Planning) Act
states, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorising (a) the procuring of abortion (b)
the doing of any other thing the doing of which is prohibited by Section 58 or 59 of the Offenses
Against the Person Act, 1861 (prohibiting the administering of drugs or the use of instruments
to procure abortion or the supplying of drugs or instruments to procure abortion) or (c) the
sale, importation into the State, manufacture, advertising or display of abortifacients.”  Id. § 10.
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in Ireland for the unlawful performing of an abortion.31
C. Personal/Fundamental Rights Cases
Irish courts during the 1960s and 1970s, finding a need to render
the law concerning individual rights more explicit, began to hand
down decisions protecting personal rights that were not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution.32  The justification for these holdings
came from the wording of Article 40 as well as from natural law ju-
risprudence, which suggest that there are certain fundamental rights
which are superior and antecedent to any man-made law.
In 1965, the plaintiff in Ryan v. Attorney General argued that
fluoridation of water violated her right of bodily integrity, a right not
explicitly contained in the Constitution.33  Although the plaintiff lost
her case, the Court held that the right of bodily integrity was a per-
sonal right tacitly contemplated by Article 40.3.1.34  Perhaps such an
acknowledgment is not shocking from an American perspective, yet
the justification that the Court gave for this unenumerated right is
unique.  This was the first Irish case in which the Court explicitly ar-
ticulated the view that unenumerated personal rights derived from
natural law exist.35  The Court found that these fundamental personal
rights result from the “Christian and democratic nature of the
state,”36 citing a passage from the Papal Encyclical Letter “Peace on
Earth” as particular support for the existence of a right to bodily in-
tegrity.37  Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Liam Hamilton, re-
marked that this outwardly Catholic opinion marked the beginning of
“a long and tortuous debate on the proper place of Christian moral
teaching in Irish legal and political life,”38 a debate that clearly con-
tinues today.
The presence of natural law in Irish constitutional jurisprudence
continued in the 1974 case of McGee v. Attorney General,39 a case of
31. See Paul Ward, Ireland: Abortion: “X” + “Y” = ?!, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 385,
387 (1995).
32. See Seth S. Stoffregen, Abortion and the Freedom to Travel in the European Economic
Community: A Perspective on Attorney General v. X, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 543, 557 (1993).
33. See Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] I.R. 294, 308 (Ir. S.C.).
34. See id. at 313-14.
35. See FRANCIS X. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND: AN
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 115 (1997).
36. Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] I.R. at 312.
37. See id. at 314.
38. Hamilton, supra note 22, at 545.
39. [1974] I.R. 284 (Ir. S.C.).
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particular importance in the history of Irish abortion law.  McGee
concerned the right of a woman to import contraceptives not legally
available in Ireland.40  While the Court ruled against the woman, the
McGee Court was the first to recognize the right to marital privacy as
either an unenumerated personal right guaranteed under Article
40.3,41 or as a familial right under Article 4142 of the Constitution.43
The presence of natural law theory in the McGee decision is un-
mistakable.  Justice Walsh stated, “In this country it falls finally upon
the judges to interpret the Constitution and in doing so to determine,
where necessary, the rights which are superior or antecedent to positive
law. . . .”44  He went on to note that the terms of Article 40.3 expressly
subordinate the law to justice, and that natural rights need to be in-
terpreted by judges according to the principles of prudence, justice,
and charity.45
Justices Walsh and Griffin were both careful in their opinions to
explain that, although they had recognized the right to marital pri-
vacy, abortion remained illegal.46  Despite these attempts by Walsh
and Griffin to clarify the law on abortion, Irish anti-abortion activists
feared the McGee decision would become the building block for a
Roe v. Wade47-type decision, similar to the role Griswold v. Connecti-
cut48 played in the United States.49  Such fears led, at least in part, to
the campaign to add the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitu-
tion.50
D. The Eighth Amendment
In 1981 the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign, a lay organization,
began the campaign for the Eighth Amendment.  The campaign
40. See id. at 305.
41. See id. at 314-15.
42. See id. at 313.
43. See KINGSTON ET AL., supra note 20.
44. McGee v. Attorney General [1974] I.R. at 318 (emphasis added).
45. See id. at 318-19.
46. See id. at 305, 335.
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a state law that makes abortions criminal without
regard to the stage of pregnancy violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring unconstitutional a state law forbidding the use of con-
traceptives because it intruded upon the right to marital privacy).
49. See GERARD HOGAN & GERRY WHYTE, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION: J. M. KELLY 791
(3d ed. 1994).
50. See KINGSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 4.
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arose out of fear of a Roe v. Wade-like decision in Irish courts.51  The
goal of the campaign was to amend the Constitution to specifically
protect the right to life of the unborn.52  It was thought that not only
would the Amendment prevent Irish courts from allowing abortion
based on an unenumerated right to privacy, but it would also make it
considerably more difficult for the legislature to pass a bill legalizing
abortion.53  In order for the Oireachtas to pass such a bill, they would
first have to secure a majority vote in the Oireachtas in favor of
holding a referendum, and then convince a majority of voters to re-
peal the Constitutional amendment—a feat much more difficult to
achieve than merely convincing a majority of the members of the
Oireachtas to vote in favor of a bill legalizing abortion.54
The people of Ireland approved the Eighth Amendment on Sep-
tember 7, 1983, with sixty-seven percent voting in favor of the addi-
tion to the Constitution.55  The wording of the Eighth Amendment,
which became Article 40.3.3, stated:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with
due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its
laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and
vindicate that right.
While some scholars believed that, given the established position
of Catholicism in Irish law, the Eighth Amendment appeared to give
the fetal life absolute priority,56 others read the amendment as al-
lowing abortion in limited circumstances.57  Those who had cam-
paigned for the Amendment clearly wished to ban all abortions,58 but
their strategy backfired when judges interpreted the Eighth Amend-
ment to allow abortion in certain limited circumstances.
E. SPUC v. Open Door
In the first test of the scope of the Eighth Amendment, the Soci-
ety for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) filed a complaint
on June 28, 1985 against two clinics, Open Door Counselling and the
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See IR. CONST. arts. 46, 47 (describing the amendment and referendum process).
55. See Jeffrey A. Weinstein, “An Irish Solution to an Irish Problem”: Ireland’s Struggle
with Abortion Law, 10 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 173 (1993).
56. See Butler & Gregory, supra note 17, at 458.
57. See Keith S. Koegler, Ireland’s Abortion Information Act of 1995, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1125-26 (1996).
58. See Weinstein, supra note 55, at 172.
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Dublin Well Woman Centre.59  These two clinics provided non-
directive counseling on pregnancy options and referred clients to
overseas abortion clinics when clients chose such a course of action.60
The SPUC sought to enjoin these clinics on the basis that their ac-
tions were violating the right to life of the unborn as contained in the
Eighth Amendment.61
The High Court held that the counseling offered by the clinics
violated the Eighth Amendment because it assisted in the destruction
of the right to life of the unborn, a right found to be “fundamental,”
and therefore superior to the rights of privacy, association, and free-
dom of expression.62  On this basis the court issued a permanent in-
junction against the clinics,63 a ruling that the counseling centers ap-
pealed.64
The clinics met with little success at the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the permanent injunction restraining the defendants from
assisting pregnant women “to travel abroad to obtain abortions by
referral to a clinic, by the making of their travel arrangements, or by
informing them of the identity, location, and method of communica-
tion with a specified clinic or clinics.”65  In its decision, the Court fo-
cused on fundamental rights, and held that the right to life of the un-
born was of a superior order to that of freedom of expression.66
Justice Finlay, in the leading judgment, stated that “the defendants
were assisting in the ultimate destruction of the life of the unborn by
abortion.”67  Thus, the Court held there was no constitutional right to
information about the availability of a service of abortion outside the
state which, “if availed of, would have the direct consequence of de-
stroying the expressly guaranteed constitutional right to life of the
unborn.”68
59. See id. at 174.
60. See id.
61. See Attorney General (at the relation of The Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children Ireland Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.
[1988] I.R. 593, 600 (Ir. H. Ct.).
62. See id. at 617.
63. See Attorney General (at the relation of The Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children Ireland Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and. Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.
[1988] I.R. 619, 627 (Ir. S.C.).
64. See id. at 619.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 625.
67. Id. at 624
68. Id. at 625.
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F. SPUC Challenges the Student Groups
In 1988, the SPUC sued once again to enforce the terms of the
Eighth Amendment, this time on the basis of the Open Door deci-
sion.69  In SPUC v. Coogan, the SPUC sought to prevent a student
union from publishing a booklet containing information about abor-
tion services provided in England.70  The High Court declined to
grant the plaintiff’s requested injunction, holding that the SPUC
lacked standing to sue to enforce the Open Door judgment.71  The
Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s decision, holding that the
SPUC did have the necessary standing.72  Instead of returning to the
High Court to argue the merits of the Coogan case, the SPUC ex-
panded the scope of its effort to ban the dissemination of information
on foreign legal abortion and filed a new complaint.73
Based on the favorable ruling in Coogan, which confirmed that it
had the requisite standing, the SPUC filed a complaint and sought an
injunction against other student groups74 in a case which came to be
known as SPUC v. Grogan.75  The SPUC sought an injunction to re-
strain the members of the student unions from distributing certain in-
formation relating to abortion services available outside the state.76
As before, the SPUC ran into trouble at the High Court, when
Justice Carroll referred certain questions to the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) for clarification of the relevant European Community
(EC) law.77  The High Court declined to grant an injunction in the in-
terim.78  However, the Supreme Court again ruled in favor of the
SPUC by unanimously granting the injunction sought.79
The ECJ, when answering the questions from the High Court,
went out of its way to avoid addressing any of the substantive issues
involved in the case.80  The questions concerned the possible interfer-
69. See SPUC v. Coogan [1989] I.R. 734, 737 (Ir. H. Ct.).
70. See Weinstein, supra note 55, at 179.
71. See SPUC v. Coogan [1989] I.R. at 737.
72. See SPUC v. Coogan [1989] I.R. 734, 742 (Ir. S.C.).
73. See Weinstein, supra note 55, at 180.
74. See id.  The student groups sued included the Union of Students of Ireland, the Uni-
versity College Dublin student union, and the Trinity College student union.  See id.
75. See SPUC v. Grogan [1989] I.R. 753, 758 (Ir. H. Ct.).
76. See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 49, at 794.
77. See SPUC v. Grogan [1989] I.R at 758.
78. See id. at 759.
79. See SPUC v. Grogan [1989] I.R. 753, 766 (Ir. S.C.).
80. See Case C-159/90, SPUC v. Grogan [1991] 2 CEC, 539; David Cole, “Going to Eng-
land”: Irish Abortion Law and the European Community, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
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ence an injunction might cause with the right to distribute informa-
tion about legally available services within the Community.81  The
ECJ, however, avoided the real issues by holding that, because the
providers of the information were student groups, who had no affilia-
tion with the providers of abortion services, the students were not
covered by the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty.82
G. Attorney General v. X
In what has been termed the most controversial case ever to
come before an Irish court,83 the Irish judiciary in 1992 was forced for
the first time to rule on the relationship between the lawfulness of
abortion and Article 40.3.3.84  The facts of the case were deeply dis-
turbing.  A fourteen-year-old school girl, X, was raped by a forty-
one-year-old man—the father of one of the girl’s school friends.85
The girl became pregnant as a result of the rape, and together with
her parents decided to travel to England for an abortion.86  The fam-
ily traveled to England, but before the abortion could take place they
were informed by the Garda87 that the Attorney General had ob-
tained an interim injunction restraining the girl from obtaining an
abortion.88  The family voluntarily returned to Ireland to do battle in
the courts. 89
The High Court granted the permanent injunction sought by the
Attorney General, issuing orders restraining the girl and her parents
from interfering with the right to life of the unborn, from leaving
Ireland for nine months, and from procuring or arranging an abortion
within or outside the jurisdiction.90  While Judge Costello acknowl-
edged that X was suicidal, he held that the risk of suicide was not
113, 128 (1993-94).
81. See id. at 126-27.
82. See Grogan [1991] 2 CEC at 539; Dena T. Sacco & Alexia Brown, Regulation of Abor-
tion in the European Community - Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v.
Grogan, Judgment of the European Court of Justice of 4 October 1991 in Case C-159/90 (1991),
33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 291, 291 (1992).
83. See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 49, at 796.
84. See KINGSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 6.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 6-7.
87. The term Garda refers to the Irish police force.
88. See KINGSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 7.  The Attorney General only learned of the
situation and ordered an injunction after the family inquired with the Garda whether any of the
fetal tissue could be used as evidence in the rape prosecution.  See id.
89. See id.
90. See BEYTAGH, supra note 35, at 102.
BUCKLEYFINAL2.DOC 04/02/99  3:06 PM
286 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 9:275
“one of those which may arise in the practice of medicine.”91  He ap-
plied the balancing test set forth in the Eighth Amendment and con-
cluded that the risk to the life of the unborn was of a far greater mag-
nitude than the risk to the life of the mother.92  The High Court also
held that infringement of the EC right to travel was permitted in this
case based on public policy and that the EC allowed national gov-
ernments discretion on moral issues.93
The reaction to this ruling in Ireland and throughout the world
was overwhelming.  In Dublin, protestors carried signs that read,
among other things, “Ireland Defends Men’s Right to Procreate by
Rape.”94  An angry editorial expressed that, “[w]here the parents of
the raped girl went wrong was to break the unwritten rules of the
Irish hypocrisy game by acting in an open and honourable manner.”95
On February 23, 1992, an opinion poll showed that sixty-six percent
of Irish people wanted to change the Constitution to permit abortion
in limited circumstances.96  It seems the former moral absolutism of
Irish citizens and the judiciary began to fade under the particularly
tragic facts of this case.  The entire country held its breath waiting for
the Supreme Court’s ruling on the appeal by the girl’s parents.
And the country seemed to breath a collective sigh of relief
when, on February 26, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court
injunction by a four-to-one majority.97  The key difference in the rea-
soning between that of the Supreme Court majority and the High
Court was in the classification of suicide as a qualifying medical risk
to the life of the mother under the Eighth Amendment.98  Chief Jus-
tice Finlay implicitly held that suicide, in certain situations, qualifies
91. Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 11 (Ir. S.C.).  Presumably, the discussion of
medical risk was framed around the typical Catholic distinction between direct and indirect
abortion.  Under Catholic law only indirect abortions are permissible and these typically take
place when surgical procedures are performed to save the life of the mother, with the uninten-
tional and indirect result of killing the fetus.  See JOHN A. HARDON, POCKET CATHOLIC
DICTIONARY 4-5 (1985)
92. See Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. at 12.
93. See Attorney General v. X [1992] 12 I.L.R.M. 401, 403 (Ir. H. Ct.).
94. Weinstein, supra note 55, at 191.
95. Id.
96. See id.  This result came just nine years after 67% of voters had approved the Eighth
Amendment giving constitutional protection to right to life of the unborn.  See Jason Bennetto,
A Catholic Doctor Faces the Demands of Reality; as a Furor Over a 14-year-old Irish Rape Vic-
tim Mounts, Jason Bennetto Looks at England as an Abortion Heaven, THE INDEPENDENT,
Feb. 23, 1992, at 2.
97. See BEYTAGH, supra note 35, at 103.
98. See discussion supra note 91.
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as a risk to the life of the mother.99  He stated that where there is sub-
stantial psychological evidence that the threat of suicide is a very real
threat, “it is almost impossible to prevent self-destruction in a young
girl in the situation in which this defendant is if she were to decide to
carry out her threat of suicide.”100  On the basis of this presumption,
the risk to the life of the unborn is no greater than the risk to the life
of the mother.  Finlay stated that the proper test to be used under the
Eighth Amendment is that “if it is established as a matter of prob-
ability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct
from the health, of the mother, which can only be avoided by termi-
nation of her pregnancy, such termination is permissible, having re-
gard to the true interpretation of Article 40.3.3.”101  Here, X met the
test based on psychological evidence of her suicidal state.102
Justice Hederman dissented, arguing that, for the purpose of jus-
tifying an abortion, a risk of self-destruction could not be equated
with medical risks to the life of the mother.103  He opined that what X
needed was “loving and sympathetic care and professional counsel-
ling and all the protection which State agencies can provide or fur-
nish.”104  He believed, contrary to Finlay, that “[s]uicide threats can
be contained,”105 and that in determining the ruling, the certain death
of the fetus should outweigh the uncertain death of X.106
It should be noted that three of the five justices were of the
opinion that the right to travel could be restricted in favor of the right
to life of the unborn.  This case therefore was decided on the theo-
retical basis of whether X would be allowed to have an abortion in
Ireland (because if not, she did not have the right to travel to obtain
one).107  Following the X case the law in Ireland was that a woman
had the right to an abortion where there was a real and substantial
risk to her life, but that when such a risk did not exist, the woman did
99. See Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 55 (Ir. S.C.).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 53-54.
102. See id. at 54-55.
103. See id. at 66-75 (Hederman, J., dissenting)
104. Id. at 76
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See Cole, supra note 80, at 133.  While the holding of this case was that X was allowed
to terminate her pregnancy in Ireland, X nevertheless had to travel to England because no Irish
doctors will openly perform abortions.  See Kate O’Callaghan, Ireland’s Other Troubles; After
Centuries of Silence and Fear, the Irish Finally Confront the Reality of Abortion, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 1993, at 22.
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not have a right to travel in order to have the procedure performed.108
Irish women could only go abroad to have procedures that were legal,
if not available, in Ireland.109
H. Maastricht
Before the X case dramatically changed Irish abortion law and
public opinion, the Irish government had lobbied its European part-
ners for the adoption of a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty,110 which
guaranteed Ireland’s pro-life constitutional provision would not be
affected by European Union law.  This effort apparently resulted
from the ECJ’s ruling in Grogan, which held that abortion was a
“service” under the Treaty of Rome.111  The adopted protocol, Proto-
col No. 17, reads as follows:
Nothing in the Treaty of the European Union or in the Treaties es-
tablishing the European Communities or in the Treaties or Acts
modifying or supplementing those Treaties shall affect the applica-
tion in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.112
The X case, however, caused the Irish government to completely
reverse its previous position on abortion in the Maastricht Treaty.113
Fearing that Irish voters, in the aftermath of the X case, might vote
against Ireland’s accession to the Maastricht Treaty because of Pro-
tocol No. 17, the government decided to seek an amendment to the
Protocol that would ensure that EC rights to travel and information
would continue to be available to Irish citizens after ratification of
the Treaty on European Union.114
The other members of the EC refused to reopen the debate on
the Protocol (fearing that this would reopen debate on other treaty
issues), so the Irish government had to settle for a Solemn Declara-
108. See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 49, at 803
109. See Koegler, supra note 57, at 1134.
110. See Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty].
111. See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 49, at 795.  The Treaty of Rome is the governing
document of the European Economic Community.  The Treaty guarantees the right to travel
between member states in order to receive services.  See Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 60, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 40 [hereinafter Treaty of
Rome].  Therefore, after abortion was classified as a service by the ECJ it was feared that any
Irish restrictions on traveling for the purpose of obtaining an abortion might violate European
Community law.  See Koegler, supra note 57, at 1144-45.
112. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 110, at 362 (Protocol annexed to the treaty on Euro-
pean Union and to the Treaties Establishing the European Communities [Regarding Ireland]).
113. See Cole, supra note 80, at 134.
114. See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 49, at 803-04.
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tion of the intentions of the High Contracting Parties on the matter
of the Protocol.115  The Solemn Declaration stated that for the treaty
parties:
[I]t was and is their intention that the Protocol shall not limit free-
dom to travel between Member State or, in accordance with condi-
tions which may be laid down, in conformity with Community law,
by Irish legislation, to obtain or make available in Ireland informa-
tion relating to services lawfully available in Member States.116
Although adopted by the EC Foreign Ministers on May 1, 1992,
the status of the Solemn Declaration is unclear.117  The prevailing
view is that the Declaration is not legally binding.  In all likelihood,
the Declaration is nothing more than a statement of political intent.118
I. The 1992 Referenda
In yet another political attempt to secure support for the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the Irish government held three referenda dealing with
abortion law on November 25, 1992.  The first referendum, approved
by 62.3% of voters, added the following phrase to Article 40.3.3 as
the Thirteenth Amendment:119 “This subsection shall not limit free-
dom to travel between the State and another state.”120  The second
referendum also proposed to modify Article 40.3.3 by including an
additional phrase: “This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain
or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be
laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available
in another state.”121  The second referendum was approved by 59.8%
of voters and became the Fourteenth Amendment.122  The third ref-
erendum proposed to amend Article 40.3.3 to read, “It shall be un-
lawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such termination is
necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother
where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving rise to a real
and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of self-destruction.”123
115. See id. at 804.
116. Cole, supra note 80, at 134 (quoting Declaration of the High Contracting Parties to the
Treaty on European Union, European Community, February 7, 1992).
117. See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 49 at 805.
118. See id.
119. See Weinstein, supra note 55, at 198.
120. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3 (incorporating Thirteenth Amendment).
121. Id. (incorporating Fourteenth Amendment).
122. See Weinstein, supra note 55, at 198.
123. Id.
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This third referendum was defeated 34.6% to 65.4%.124  Neither side
of the controversy completely supported the third referendum.  Many
pro-choice advocates did not wish to eliminate risk of suicide as a
ground for permitting abortion, while many pro-life advocates
thought the proposed limitation did too little.  These pro-life advo-
cates instead wanted either to repeal the Eighth Amendment or sub-
stitute more stringent wording.125
The 1992 referenda eased tensions between Irish and EC laws,126
as the outcome seemed to settle issues of rights to travel and to in-
formation.  Following the vote, Irish politicians promised to intro-
duce legislation concerning permissible abortions in circumstances
such as rape, incest, and risk of suicide.127  However, as of 1998 no
such legislation had been produced.
J. 1995 Freedom of Information Bill
In 1995, the Oireachtas passed legislation relating to the Four-
teenth Amendment that provided for freedom of information for
services legally available in other states.128  Following passage of the
Bill by the Oireachtas, then President Mary Robinson referred the
Bill to the Supreme Court for an opinion on the constitutionality of
the legislation before signing the Bill into law.129  The case was argued
before the Supreme Court by three sets of counsel: one for the At-
torney General who supported the Bill; one for pregnant women who
also supported the Bill; and one for the unborn who opposed the
Bill.130  Counsel for the unborn argued the Bill was unconstitutional
because it violated the natural law right to life, which was superior
and antecedent to the Constitution.131  In a unanimous decision, the
Supreme Court declared on May 12, 1995 that the Bill was constitu-
124. See id.
125. See Koegler, supra note 57, at 1135.
126. See Butler & Gregory, supra note 17, at 444.
127. See Jill Serjeant, Legal Abortion On The Way, Despite No Vote, REUTER LIBRARY
REPORT, Nov. 29, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld file.
128. See Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Preg-
nancies) Act, No. 5 (1995).  The Act makes it legal to distribute information on abortion serv-
ices abroad so long as the information does not encourage or promote the termination of the
pregnancy.  See Koegler, supra note 57, at 1117.
129. See In the Matter of Article 26 of the Constitution and in the Matter of the reference
to the Court of the Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of
Pregnancies) Bill [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 81 (Ir. S.C.) [hereinafter Information Bill case].
130. See id.
131. See id.
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tional.132
The decision by the Court was significant in many respects, not
the least of which was that the Court affirmed the holding of the X
case.133  Counsel for the unborn attacked the validity of the X case
holding on the basis that it was contrary to natural law and that natu-
ral law was superior to the Constitution.134  Not only did the Court re-
affirm the holding of the X case, but it held for the first time that the
Constitution was not subordinate to natural law and could be
changed by the people, even if the change violated a principle of
natural law.135  This was a watershed holding in Irish jurisprudence,
since natural law theory had been the foundation of many of the
Court’s conservative, religion-based opinions in the past.136  As stated
previously, the tradition of natural law jurisprudence in Ireland usu-
ally paralleled Catholic doctrine; as a result, legislative proposals in-
consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church were consis-
tently found to conflict with the spirit of the Constitution.137
While the Court clearly intended to state unequivocally that
natural law was not superior to the Constitution, the Court’s basis for
so holding has been criticized.  To begin with, the Court never prop-
erly established the basis for the Constitution as a document free
from any natural law influence.138  While the Court can legitimately
state that Irish courts have never recognized the provisions of natural
law as superior to the Constitution, this is only because the issue had
never been squarely put to a court.  Irish courts, however, have un-
mistakably noted the superiority of natural law, if only in dicta.139
132. See id.  While some commentators have found significance in the unanimous holding in
the face of opposition by the Catholic Church, see, for example, Carder, supra note 24, at 274,
such a view should be tempered by the fact that a unanimous decision is required in this situa-
tion per Article 26.2.2 of the Irish Constitution.  See IR. CONST. art. 26.2.2.
133. The Court specifically affirmed the test as set out in the X case (that abortion is per-
missible when there is a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother) and went on to say
that once that test is met, the mother is entitled to information concerning the available abor-
tion services.  See Information Bill case [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. at 98.
134. For an explanation of the Church’s position on abortion, see CATECHISM, supra note
21, ¶ 2270-75 (1995).  See also HARDON, supra note 91.
135. See Information Bill case [1995] 2 I.L.R.M. at 83.
136. See David O’Connor, Limiting “Public Morality” Exceptions to Free Movement in
Europe: Ireland’s Role in a Changing European Union, 22 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 695, 708-09
(1997).
137. See id. at 709.
138. For examples of such natural law influence, see the Preamble, Article 40, and Article
41 of the Irish Constitution.
139. See Gerard Whyte, Religion and the Irish Constitution, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 725,
744 (1997).
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Moreover, the Constitution itself suggests that it is based in natural
law.140  Thus, how the Court manages to discharge the traditional in-
terpretation of the Constitution remains unclear.  As Professor
Whyte points out, the Court fails to engage, in any meaningful way,
those judicial precedents and constitutional provisions that appear to
endorse natural law theory.141  Some have suggested that this unex-
plained rejection of natural law is based on a wish of the Court to
bring Ireland into line with the requirements of the European Un-
ion.142
K. Summary of Abortion Law before the C Case
Prior to the C case, the test for determining when an abortion
could lawfully be carried out was contained in the majority judgment
in the X case.143  While the X case decision held that a threat of sui-
cide can constitute a real and substantial risk to the life of the
mother,144 some have disputed that the issue was actually settled with
finality.  Justice Walsh, a former Supreme Court Justice, argued that
because the Attorney General failed to contest the assertion that a
risk of suicide constituted a threat to the life of the mother for the
purposes of Article 40.3.3, the Court’s acceptance of this point cannot
be regarded as conclusive or binding.145  Therefore, the status of the
law with regard to the suicide issue was not clear prior to the C case.
The law was also such that if an Irish woman did not meet the
test as set forth in the X case, her only option was to seek an abortion
overseas. Although this was not a positive right, the Thirteenth
Amendment specified that women would not be prevented from
traveling for such a purpose.146
140. See IR. CONST. prmbl., art. 41.1.1.
141. See id.
142. See O’Connor, supra note 136, at 709-10.
143. See generally Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 41-62 (Ir. S.C.).
144. See id. at 55.
145. See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 49, at 807 & n.61.
146. See Koegler, supra note 57, at 1142; discussion infra notes 167-69.
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IV.  THE C CASE IN THE COURTS
A. The District Court147
Originally the EHB planned to appear before the district court
on November 19, 1997 to advocate giving the parents custody of C.148
This was on the basis of an agreement between the EHB and the par-
ents that C would be released to her parents so that she would be
able to travel to Britain for an abortion.149  The EHB felt that this
would be the easiest way for C to procure an abortion because many
in the legal community believed that the EHB, as a state agency,
could never assist or fund the termination of a pregnancy.150
However, as discussed previously, the agreement fell through the
night before the hearing, apparently the result of the parents’ deci-
sion to join forces with the pro-life groups.151  Because of this unex-
pected twist, the EHB received a two-day extension of its care order
for C at the November 19 hearing instead of releasing C to her par-
ents as originally planned.152
Two days later, on November 21, an eight-hour hearing took
place at the district court in proceedings under the Child Care Act,153
in which the EHB, the parents, and C each had separate legal repre-
sentation.154  The proceedings took the form of an EHB application
for an interim care order in respect of C.155
After hearing evidence, Judge Fahy granted an extension of the
interim care order and issued orders pursuant to Section
13(7)(a)(iii)156 and Section 17(4)157 of the Child Care Act stating the
147. The proceedings in the district court were held in camera and no written opinion has
yet been released to the public.  Therefore, it should be noted that much of what is known
about the district court ruling comes from the High Court opinion.  See generally C case [1998]
1 I.L.R.M. 460 (Ir. H. Ct.).
148. See Chronology of Events, supra note 7.
149. See id.
150. See Kennedy & Cullen, supra note 13.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Chronology of Events, supra note 7.  Per Section 17 of the Child Care Act, the
health board may petition the district court for an extension of an interim care order when the
grounds on which the original care order was granted still exist.  See Child Care Act, No. 17, §
17 (1991).
154. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 460 (Ir. H. Ct.).
155. See id. at 470.
156. Section 13(7)(a)(iii) states that when a judge has issued an emergency care order for a
child, the judge “may, of his own motion or on the application of any person, give such direc-
tions (if any) as he thinks proper with respect to the medical or psychiatric examination, treat-
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following: that C be allowed to travel to a location where she could
have her pregnancy terminated; that C be afforded treatment in the
form of termination of her pregnancy; that the EHB be permitted to
execute all necessary documents for such treatment; that C receive
such further treatment and examination as recommended by her
medical advisors; and that the EHB be allowed to make all such ar-
rangements forthwith.158
Judge Fahy refused to grant a request by the parents that the or-
der be stayed pending appeal.159  In an effort to prevent their daugh-
ter from terminating her pregnancy before they could lodge an ap-
peal, the parents petitioned the High Court and were granted the
requested stay.160
B. The High Court
The full appeal hearing before the High Court took place on
November 28, 1997.  The parents challenged the ruling of the district
court on sixteen grounds that were subsequently grouped by presid-
ing Judge Geoghegan into six categories.  The six categories were as
follows:
1. denial of fair hearing;
2. the term “medical treatment” in the Child Care Act could
never be interpreted to include termination of pregnancy;
3. the district court did not have the power to weigh constitu-
tional rights;
4. if “medical treatment” does include termination of pregnancy,
the relevant provision of the Child Care Act is unconstitutional;
5. the district court failed to have due regard to the rights and
duties of C’s parents as required under Section 24 of the Child Care
Act and, alternatively, that if she did have due regard then Section 24
is unconstitutional; and
6. because the test as set out in the X case was not met, the dis-
ment or assessment of the child.”  Child Care Act § 13(7)(a)(iii) (emphasis added).
157. Section 17(4) provides that “[w]here an interim care order is made, the justice may
order that any directions given under subsection (7) of section 13 may remain in force subject to
such variations, if any, as he may see fit to make or the justice may give directions in relation to
any of the matters mentioned in the said subsection and the provisions of that section shall ap-
ply with any necessary modifications.”  Child Care Act § 17(4).
158. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. at 467.
159. See id. at 471.
160. See Chronology of Events, supra note 7.
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trict court improperly granted the order.161
The first category concerned claims that the parents were denied
a fair hearing at the district court level.162  The parents claimed their
attorney was unable to do proper justice to their case because he did
not know that authority to terminate the pregnancy was being sought
until the morning of the hearing.163  Judge Geoghegan promptly dis-
missed this argument stating that it was reasonable, based on the evi-
dence, to infer that the parents did in fact know that termination of
the pregnancy would be discussed.164
The parents also claimed the district court denied them a fair
hearing by refusing to make a direction under Section 17(4) of the
Child Care Act that C be assessed by a psychiatrist selected by the
parents.165  The High Court quickly dismissed this claim as well, stat-
ing that the district court judge had the discretion to refuse such an
exam because two psychiatric exams had already taken place and
there was evidence that further exams were not in the interest of C’s
mental health.166
The High Court agreed with the parents that the district court
erred in failing to grant an adjournment on Friday afternoon until
Monday in order for the parents to consult a psychiatrist to challenge
the psychiatric evidence before the court.167  However, Judge Geog-
hegan explained that allowing such an adjournment would not have
made a difference in the granting of the order, and as a discretionary
matter he chose not to quash the district court’s order on this
ground.168  It is unclear from the written opinion why the judge felt
that this would have no possible effect on the order, since C’s mental
state and the psychiatric evidence thereof was a keystone to the dis-
trict court decision.  The opinion hints that Judge Geoghegan felt the
two psychiatrists who testified were trustworthy enough that a cross-
examination of their findings, aided by consultation with another
psychiatrist, would not have affected the order.169
The parents’ final argument asserting denial of a fair hearing was
161. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 468 (Ir. H. Ct.).
162. See id. at 471.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. at 471.
166. See id. at 471-72.
167. See id. at 472.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 471-72.
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that the district court judge erred in refusing a stay on the order
pending appeal.170  The High Court quickly dismissed this ground,
stating simply that the granting of such a stay is a matter of discretion
for the district court judge.171
The parents’ second ground for appeal was that the district court
judge erred in holding that the term “medical treatment” in the Child
Care Act could include termination of pregnancy.172  The High Court
disagreed that the term “medical treatment” could never include
termination of pregnancy, but restricted its holding to the particular
facts of this case, finding that termination of pregnancy was a neces-
sary medical treatment under the Child Care Act for C’s mental con-
dition.173
The High Court cited psychiatric testimony given at the trial
court level in support of its position that, in this case, the termination
of C’s pregnancy was a necessary medical treatment.174  Dr. Byrne, a
well-respected psychiatrist who testified at the district court hearing,
stated that C said, “I would kill myself if I had the child” and when
asked why replied, “Because it is not my child.”175  Dr. Byrne also tes-
tified that he felt C’s risk of suicide was “a very significant risk” and
that the risk was becoming more immediate as time went on because
C was becoming increasingly unable to deny the pregnancy.176  Dr.
Byrne at another point referred to the risk as an “immediate risk.”177
After citing this evidence, the High Court stated that the evidence
provided an adequate foundation for finding that termination of
pregnancy in this case must constitute ‘medical treatment’ within any
normal definition.”178
The third ground for appeal involved arguments by the parents
that the district court was not qualified to weigh constitutional
rights.179  This category of grounds was quickly discredited by the
High Court, which clarified that the only issue a district court could
not consider is the validity of any statutory enactments under the
170. See id. at 472.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 472-73.
174. See id. at 473.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 473-74.
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Constitution.180  The court emphasized that district courts must al-
ways be conscious of the Constitution and rights under it in all of
their decisions.181
The court similarly dismissed the fourth ground for appeal that
the relevant provisions of the Child Care Act were unconstitutional.182
There was little discussion of this point.183
The fifth ground for appeal advanced by the parents was that the
district court judge failed to give proper weight to the concerns of C’s
parents, as required by Section 24 of the Child Care Act.184  Judge
Geoghegan again disagreed with the parents.185  He reminded the
parents that in relation to the unborn child they were grandparents,
and as such had no constitutional rights.186  Their only constitutional
rights were in relation to their daughter.187  The High Court went on
to find that Judge Fahy had given proper weight to the concerns of
the parents in relation to their daughter.188  The High Court stated
that Judge Fahy was “entitled to take the view that the parents were
neglectful parents and that the child should properly be in temporary
care. . . .”189  The court also cited the fact that Judge Fahy listened to
the father’s evidence during the hearing, and specifically requested
that the mother give evidence as well.190
Judge Geoghegan also dismissed the alternative ground for ap-
peal that argued if Judge Fahy had given proper weight to the rights
of C’s parents under Section 24, then Section 24 was unconstitu-
tional.191  It appears from the opinion that the claim of unconstitu-
180. See id. at 474.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 474-75.
184. See id. at 475.  Section 24 of the Child Care Act provides that in any proceeding before
a court under the Act in relation to the care and protection of a child, the rights and duties of
parents which exist under the Constitution or otherwise will be considered, although the wel-
fare of the child is the first and paramount consideration.  See Child Care Act, No. 17, § 24
(1991).
185. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 475 (Ir. H. Ct.).
186. See id.  Article 42 of the Constitution grants only parents certain inalienable rights in
the education and upbringing of their children.  Grandparents have no corresponding rights
under the Constitution, and they are not given the same reverence under the Constitution as
are a child’s parents.  See IR. CONST. art. 42.
187. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. at 475.
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
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tionality was based on an argument by the parents that Section 24
was unconstitutional in that it causes the court to ignore the constitu-
tionally-guaranteed right to life of the unborn.  Judge Geoghegan
dismissed this claim, stating simply that there was nothing in Section
24 that led to such a conclusion.192
On the final ground for appeal, the parents challenged the actual
findings of Judge Fahy, arguing that the district court judge had failed
to meet the requirements of the test set out in the X case, and there-
fore her decision to allow an abortion was invalid.193  The X case held
that where there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct
from the health, of the mother and that risk can only be avoided by
the termination of the mother’s pregnancy, then such termination is
permissible.194  The basis for the parents’ argument comes from the
wording of Judge Fahy’s decision where she states, “I am of the
opinion that the test as set down in the X case has not been met, as I
do not believe that the threat of suicide is imminent.”195  However,
the High Court considered Judge Fahy’s further explanation to mean
that she did find the risk of suicide to be “real and substantial.”196
The court determined Judge Fahy’s word choice to be “deliberate
and intended to correspond with the wording of the test under the X
case.”197  Nowhere in the X case is it required that the danger of sui-
cide be immediate or imminent, so Fahy’s words were not found to
be dispositive.198
Counsel for C had made a counter-argument that even if the re-
quirements of the X case had not been met, the district court’s order
was permissible on the basis of the travel amendment.199  The High
Court addressed this counter-argument in dicta, disagreeing with the
notion that C could have been allowed to travel abroad in order to
terminate her pregnancy on the authority of the travel amendment
alone.200  Judge Geoghegan clarified that the travel amendment is
framed in negative terms and, as a consequence, means only that in-
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 53-54 (Ir. S.C.).
195. C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 476 (Ir. H. Ct.).
196. Id. at 476-77.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 476.
199. See id. at 477.  The travel amendment states that nothing in Article 40.3.3, which guar-
antees the right to life of the unborn, shall limit freedom to travel between Ireland and another
state.  See id. at 478.
200. See id.
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junctions will not be placed against traveling for that purpose.201
Judge Geoghegan did not think that the amendment “was ever in-
tended to give some new substantial right.”202  In his view, a court un-
der the Child Care Act could not authorize travel for an abortion
which would not be allowed under Irish law, because the right to life
of the unborn is unaffected by the travel amendment.203  In conclu-
sion, Judge Geoghegan reaffirmed that he had upheld the district
court order only because the termination in this case was one which
was lawful under the Irish Constitution.204  That is to say, C was al-
lowed to travel to England for an abortion only because the termina-
tion was one which would be legal if performed in Ireland.205
Following this adverse ruling, C’s parents considered appealing
their case to the Supreme Court.206  However, when it appeared that
no funding would be available for such an effort, the parents an-
nounced that they would not be seeking an appeal.207  Shortly thereaf-
ter C traveled to England and had her pregnancy terminated.208
V.  C CASE ANALYSIS
There are several aspects of the High Court’s decision in the C
case that warrant further discussion.  The risk of suicide as a qualify-
ing risk to the life of the mother will be examined, as will the rights of
parents, the role of the State, and the likely consequences of the
holding.
A. Suicide as a Qualifying Risk to the Life of the Mother
Acknowledging suicide as a risk to the life of the mother that
justifies abortion is at odds with Ireland’s tradition of natural law ju-
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 479.  The judge was clarifying that while it is permissible to allow a child un-
der the Child Care Act to travel for a medically necessary abortion (because such an abortion
is legal under Irish law), it would not be permissible for the Irish courts to authorize the State
to fund and facilitate an abortion which would be illegal under Irish law.  See id.
204. See id. at 479-80.
205. While C’s abortion therefore theoretically could have been performed in Ireland, C
still had to travel to England because Irish doctors will not openly perform abortions. See
O’Callaghan, supra note 107.
206. See Padraig O’Morain, Archbishop Not to Fund Court Appeal on Abortion, IR. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 1.
207. See id.; Christine Newman, Laws Sought on Abortion After Parents’ Decision to Halt
Action, IR. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at 10.
208. Christine Newman & Jim Cusack, 13-Year-Old Rape Victime had Abortion Yesterday,
IR. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1997, at 4.
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risprudence.  As mentioned previously, Ireland’s natural law tradi-
tion draws in large part from the Catholic legal tradition.  Under
Catholic natural law, direct abortion (meaning an abortion willed ei-
ther as an end or a means) is forbidden.209  The Catechism210 declares
that from the moment of conception a human being must be recog-
nized as having the rights of a person—among which is the inviolable
right of every innocent being to life.211  Therefore, only so-called indi-
rect abortion is permissible under Catholic natural law.  Indirect
abortion “is the foreseen but merely permitted evacuation of a fetus
which cannot survive outside the womb.”212  The abortion of the fetus
is not the intended or directly willed result, but the side effect of
some legitimate procedure.  Since the abortion was not the intended
result, it is not a moral evil (although surely morally regrettable).
Therefore, it is consistent with Catholic natural law to allow abor-
tions that result from actions taken solely for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother.  In circumstances where the mother’s life is at
risk, the willed action is taken in order to save the life of the mother,
while the resulting death of the fetus is an unintended consequence.
The history surrounding the Eighth Amendment to the Irish
Constitution suggests that the wording that was adopted was in-
tended to correspond to the Catholic natural law framework de-
scribed above.213  It therefore seems illegitimate that Irish courts
would acknowledge a risk of suicide as a qualifying risk to the life of
the mother when it is obvious that such a holding conflicts with the
intended natural law character of the Amendment.214  A case in which
an abortion is performed due to a risk of suicide is fundamentally dif-
209. See HARDON, supra note 91.
210. The Catechism is an official statement of Catholic doctrine, approved and sanctioned
by the Pope.
211. See CATECHISM, supra note 21, ¶ 2270.
212. HARDON, supra note 91.
213. See KINGSTON, ET AL., supra note 20, at 4-5.
214. While prima facie it may appear that the 1995 Information Bill ruling suggests that the
courts do not have to be bound by natural law, the holding in the Information Bill case can be
limited to the proposition that the people may amend the Constitution in such a way as is con-
trary to natural law, not that natural law no longer has a place in Irish jurisprudence.  In con-
trast to the Fourteenth Amendment which provided the basis for the Information Bill, the
Eighth Amendment was enacted in congruence with natural law—and what the courts have
done is to impermissibly extinguish such an influence.  Additionally, the fact that in 1992 voters
rejected an amendment that would have clarified that a risk of suicide is not a risk to the life of
the mother, as contemplated by the Eighth Amendment, does not change the natural law basis
of the Amendment.  There are numerous reasons why such clarification could have been re-
jected, and thus a no vote on the 1992 referendum is not conclusive as regards the natural law
framework of the Eighth Amendment.
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ferent than a typical indirect abortion case.  In a typical indirect abor-
tion scenario, a third party takes action necessary to save the
mother’s life which results in the unintended and unavoidable termi-
nation of the life of the fetus.  In the case of suicide,215 a choice is
made by the mother; a choice that leads to the intended and avoid-
able termination not only of her own life, but also the life of the fetus.
So, the case of suicide involves intention, choice, and consent to
courses of action that will result in the willed death of two lives.  If
risk of suicide by itself is allowed to justify an abortion, the courts
would be permitting a choice by the mother alone to permit a direct
abortion.  It is extremely unlikely the Catholic Church or any natural
law authorities would agree that suicide could therefore qualify as a
risk to the life of the mother, making an otherwise willful and in-
tended abortion a permissible indirect abortion.  This is indeed what
the dissent in the X case tried to explain.216
The X case’s ruling on suicide as a qualifying risk deserves a
closer look.  The X case established that where a risk of suicide was
“real and substantial,” an abortion would be permitted.217  Such a test
to determine qualifying risk does not fit the wording of, nor the his-
tory behind the Eighth Amendment.  The Eighth Amendment indi-
cates only that the State will give due regard to the equal right to the
life of the mother,218 and as the dissent in the X case pointed out, the
risks to the two parties in this type of situation are not equivalent.219
If the mother has an abortion, the unborn child will surely die; there
are no other possible outcomes.  However, if the mother is denied a
legal abortion, it is not certain that she will die.
It also appears from the wording of the Eighth Amendment that
to allow an abortion due to a risk to the life of the mother, the risk
must be imminent.  If an abortion were allowed in cases involving
other than imminent risk, then the State would be giving far more
than due regard to the equal right to life of the mother.  If death of
the mother were virtually certain and the fetus could not survive out-
side the mother’s womb, then any effort to save the mother’s life that
215. Suicide by itself would in some cases qualify as a crime under Catholic natural law.
While the Church recognizes that suicide is sometimes the unavoidable product of mental dis-
ease, if it is the result of willful action, it may be a crime.  For a discussion of the Church’s posi-
tion on suicide, see CATECHISM, supra note 21, ¶¶ 2280-83.
216. See generally Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 62-77 (Ir. S.C.) (Hederman, J.,
dissenting).
217. See id. at 53-54.
218. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
219. See Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. at 75-76.
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resulted in the termination of the fetus’ life would be a case of indi-
rect abortion, which is provided for under Catholic natural law the-
ory.220
Even if the court in the C case lacked the authority to overrule
the holding in the X case,221 it did have the opportunity to clarify the
evidentiary standards necessary for establishing a real and substantial
risk to the life of the mother caused by the possibility of suicide.  In
the C case, only two psychiatrists testified, both of whom were ap-
pointed by parties not opposed to abortion.222  The parents, however,
were not allowed to have their own psychiatrist examine the girl (out
of concern for the girl’s fragile mental health), and were barred from
consulting a psychiatrist of their own in order to effectively cross-
examine the psychiatrists who testified in favor of the abortion.223
The High Court felt that such a consultation would not have changed
the outcome of the case.  Such reasoning is shocking, since it is not
universally accepted that having an abortion improves the mental
health of a desolate and despairing teen.224  What the holding of the C
case suggests is that very little evidence is needed to prove risk of sui-
cide, and an effective cross-examination of psychiatric experts will
not always be possible or permitted.  It is unfortunate that the court
in the C case did not take this opportunity to clarify the evidentiary
standards in these types of cases.
Allowing a risk of suicide to provide grounds for abortion is
troubling for the additional reason that it can be used to permit abor-
tion in a wide range of circumstances, all of which would be contrary
to natural law.  If a thirteen-year-old girl were pregnant as a result of
consensual sex, had been taken into state care, and then appeared to
be suicidal because of the pregnancy, would she be allowed to have a
legal abortion under Irish law?  The answer is clearly no.  The young
girls, X and C, were pregnant as a result of horrifying circumstances
that greatly swayed public opinion in favor of allowing the girls to
have abortions.  The outcomes of the cases may have been quite dif-
ferent if the girls had not been raped.  However, the holding of the C
case provides that abortion would be permissible, regardless of the
220. See supra notes 209-212 and accompanying text.
221. The High Court may not have had the authority to overrule a holding of the Supreme
Court, per Article 34.4.6 of the Irish Constitution, which provides that Supreme Court decisions
will in all cases be final and conclusive.  See IR. CONST. art. 34.4.6.
222. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 471 (Ir. H. Ct.).
223. See id.
224. See Attorney General v. X [1992] 1 I.R. 1, 62-77 (Ir. S.C.) (Hederman, J., dissenting).
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circumstances of the pregnancy, as long as the risk of suicide was real
and substantial.  This far-reaching consequence was not intended by
either the drafters of the Eighth Amendment or the Irish courts in
the X and C cases.  What the X and C cases really seem to aim at is
allowing abortion in circumstances where the pregnancy is the result
of rape.  However, since there is no such rape exception in Irish
law,225 the judiciary was forced to word their decisions to allow abor-
tion around the existing law.  In each case the risk of suicide was the
most convenient, if illegitimate, way to provide for this exception.  If
Ireland truly wants to retain a restrictive abortion law, the govern-
ment will have to specifically eliminate the risk of suicide as a quali-
fying risk to the life of the mother and provide for a rape exception at
law.
B. Parental Rights
Another troubling aspect of the High Court’s decision in the C
case concerns its treatment of parental rights.  Under Articles 41 and
42 of the Irish Constitution, parents are guaranteed inalienable rights
regarding the rearing of their children.226  Religious and moral educa-
tion is specifically mentioned in Article 42 as an inalienable right of
parents.227  Despite such rights, the wishes of C’s parents were over-
ruled by the court.228  While it is true that C’s parents were deemed
neglectful by the court,229 it is not obvious from the text of the Consti-
tution that such a finding necessarily deprives parents of every right
concerning the upbringing of their children.  In particular, it is not
clear from the text of the Constitution or the Child Care Act that
when, as here, parents are physically or emotionally neglectful they
automatically lose their rights to prevent their minor daughter from
terminating her pregnancy.  The Irish Constitution attaches particu-
lar importance to the rights of parents.  This case is a serious in-
225. See generally IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
226. Article 41 “recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group
of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antece-
dent and superior to all positive law.  The State. . . guarantees to protect the Family in its con-
stitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare
of the Nation and the State.”  IR. CONST. art. 41.  Under Article 42 “[t]he State acknowledges
that the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family and guarantees to respect the
inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and
moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children.”  IR. CONST. art. 42.
227. See id. art. 42.
228. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460, 475 (Ir. H. Ct.).
229. See id.
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fringement of such rights.  It is troubling that the court disposes of
these rights without discussion.
C. The Role of the State
Once a child is taken into state care, the State has an obligation
to act in the best interests of the child.230  In this case the EHB not
only looked after C’s physical well-being, but consulted at least one
psychiatrist with regard to her mental well-being.231  Eventually the
EHB asked the court to determine whether termination of pregnancy
was covered under Section 13 of the Child Care Act, which author-
izes the health board to arrange all necessary medical treatment for a
child in its care.232  This was a controversial request, even among some
health board members, based on the belief that abortion in such cir-
cumstances can never be considered a necessary medical treatment.233
In addition to the question of whether or not an abortion is medically
necessary in such a case, there is also the question of whether or not
the State has a special obligation to prevent such an abortion from
ever taking place.
Per Article 40.3.3, the State has an affirmative duty to protect
and vindicate the right to life of the unborn as far as practicable, giv-
ing only “due regard” to the equal right to life of the mother.234
Given this affirmative duty, it would seem the State could never fund
nor facilitate an elective abortion.  Even with the enactment of the
travel and information amendments, a positive right for the State to
participate in or encourage the termination of a pregnancy is never
contemplated.  The decision of a state agency to seek approval for an
abortion, and for the Irish courts to approve such an order, is there-
fore incongruous with the wording of the Constitution and past
precedents.
D. Consequences of the C Case Holding
Finally, the consequences of the holding of the C case need to be
closely examined.  As a result of this case it is now unclear who has
230. See Child Care Act, No. 17, Intro. & Gen. Note (1991).
231. See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M at 470-71.
232. See id. at 467.
233. See Paul Cullen, EHB Asked to Affirm Right to Life of the Unborn, IR. TIMES, Nov. 26,
1997, at 4; Christine Newman, Laws Sought on Abortion After Parents’ Decision to Halt Action,
IR. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at 10; Connell Criticizes Court’s Decision, IR. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at
8.
234. See IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
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the right to an abortion in Ireland and who is able to receive govern-
ment funding for such an abortion.  The C case implies that any
pregnant woman (including women whose pregnancies are the result
of consensual sex) who is sufficiently suicidal such that there is a
“real and substantial” risk to her life may have an abortion.  De-
pending upon how medical necessity is defined under the relevant
health care regulations,235 such a woman may qualify for a state-
funded abortion.
It is clear from the C case decision that as the law currently
stands, any child in the care of a health board who is pregnant and
suicidal is entitled to have an abortion funded by the Irish State.  This
means that even those young girls who are pregnant by consensual
sex will have their abortions funded, so long as they are suicidal.
What is unclear is what would happen to a young, pregnant, suicidal
girl whose parents would not allow her to have an abortion.  If the
risk is considered “real and substantial” and her parents refuse to let
her have an abortion, are these grounds for being put into state care?
Certainly if the child’s life is considered at risk by an Irish court, it
would be grounds for her being put into care, per Section 18(1) of the
Child Care Act.236  Because the C case confirmed the X case holding
that a risk of suicide can be considered a real and substantial risk to
the life of the mother, having a child put into care on such grounds is
certainly not ruled out.  If this is unacceptable to either the Irish peo-
ple or the Irish government, legislation is needed to change the cur-
rent judicially created law.
VI.  THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
The major Irish abortion decisions have been somewhat chaotic
and the consequences of their holdings unclear due to the shocking
lack of legislation on the subject.  Ireland would greatly benefit from
such long overdue legislation.  Specifically, there are several areas of
the law, some of which have already been discussed, that need clarifi-
cation.
As stated previously, allowing suicide to qualify as a risk to the
life of the mother goes against Catholic doctrine and natural law, and
235. See generally Department of Health and Children, Information Guide: Entitlements to
Health Services (visited October 5, 1998) <http://www.doh.ie/consumer/infoguid/entitle.htm>.
236. See Child Care Act., No. 17, § 17 (1991).  In this situation, it could be argued either
that the child was being ill-treated or neglected, or that her health was being or was likely to be
avoidably impaired.  For a complete list of the causes for a child being put into care under the
Child Care Act, see discussion supra note 7.
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it is contrary to the wording and history of the Eighth Amendment.
If Ireland truly wants to allow a suicide exception, the government
should hold a referendum and allow the people to vote to change the
current wording of the Eighth Amendment explicitly.  Additionally,
if suicide is approved as a permissible justification for abortion, the
government needs to enact relevant evidentiary standards; currently
it is unclear what, if any, evidence is necessary to prove that a risk of
suicide poses a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother.
Medical guidelines are also needed from the Oireachtas as to
what exactly qualifies as a “real and substantial” risk to the life of the
mother.  The view of the Irish Medical Council that abortion is never
a medically necessary treatment needs to be reconciled with the
holdings of the Irish courts.  While one can assume that anything that
would qualify as an indirect abortion under Catholic law would be in-
cluded, the Oireachtas should enact specific guidelines so as to avoid
the judicial law making of the X and C cases.
As previously mentioned, it seems likely that what the X and C
cases really sought was a rape exception to the right to life of the un-
born.  It would not be surprising if the public is also interested in es-
tablishing such an exception.  In fact, following the X case the Tao-
iseach237 promised to look into legislating on rape and incest
exceptions,238 presumably in response to public opinion favoring such
a change.  Six years later such legislation has not been adopted, and
Irish courts are still struggling to work around this lack of legislation.
Hopefully the government can be persuaded by the dangerous prece-
dent of the C case to begin legislating on such issues.  At the very
least, the people of Ireland should be given an opportunity to vote on
a constitutional referendum in favor of rape and incest exceptions to
Article 40.3.3.  Otherwise, Irish courts are likely to continue to work
around the constitutional wording in illegitimate ways.
Legislative guidance is also needed regarding the legal rights of
children in the care of the State.  The most pressing need for legisla-
tion is for health board guidelines to determine the proper procedure
to follow either if a pregnant child is in board care and there is a real
and substantial risk to her life, or if a child in care otherwise wants an
abortion.  An even more basic issue that needs to be resolved for the
health boards to do their work effectively is a definitive answer as to
whether or not an abortion can ever be considered a necessary medi-
237. The Taoiseach is the prime minister of Ireland.
238. See Serjeant, supra note 127.
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cal treatment under the Child Care Act.  There certainly is not
agreement on this issue,239 and it is up to the legislature to provide
clarity.  If such guidance is not provided, the door is open for Ireland
to begin funding abortions wholesale for children in its care, when-
ever suicide is threatened.  In addition, until the legislature clarifies
abortion law for children being cared for under the Child Care Act,
the health boards will have no choice but to seek legal assistance any-
time the issue arises.  The expense, delay, and uncertainty are likely
to be detrimental to all parties involved.
Legislation is also needed for children who remain in the care of
their parents.  It is unclear what will happen in Ireland if there is a
case involving a young, pregnant girl whose life is in danger and
whose parents will not permit her to have an abortion based on re-
ligious or moral beliefs.  Despite the holding of the C case, it seems
the parents would be able to prevent an abortion based on Articles
41 and 42 of the Constitution, which provide parents with inalienable
rights in the upbringing of their children.  In the C case, the parents
lost such control over their daughter due to their improper, neglectful
behavior.  Absent such otherwise neglectful behavior, it appears the
protections of Articles 41 and 42 could allow parents to prevent their
child from having an abortion, even if there is a real and substantial
risk to the child’s life.  Given this present uncertainty, the legislature
should clarify what rules govern such a situation.
Another issue that needs to be clarified is the availability of state
funding to travel abroad to receive an abortion.  In the C case, for the
first time, funding to travel and receive an abortion was provided for
by the State.240  It is entirely plausible this could set a precedent of
allowing indigent adult women to have the State pay for their medi-
cally necessary abortions.  While the United States has managed to
avoid funding abortions for indigent adult women,241 such an outcome
seems unlikely in Ireland.  Ireland has a much more comprehensive
social medical scheme, which basically guarantees that medically
necessary procedures are funded by the State when a patient is un-
able to pay.242  The Health Act of 1970 does, however, give the Minis-
239. See infra note 241 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 221-224 and accompa-
nying text.
240. See generally C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M. 460 (Ir. H. Ct.).
241. In the United States, indigent adult women are denied Medicaid funding for abortions
based on the theory that as adults, these women are responsible for their poverty.  That is, be-
cause the State feels that it did not cause these adults’ poverty it does not have any responsibil-
ity to pay for such medical procedures.  See KINGSTON ET AL., supra note 20, at 264-65.
242. See generally Department of Health and Children, supra note 235.
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ter for Health a large amount of discretion in determining how such
medical services are provided and administered.243  It is thus possible
that funding for the termination of pregnancies could be excluded,
perhaps on the basis of the Eighth Amendment.244  However, given
the C case holding, this seems unlikely to happen.  Under Ireland’s
health care scheme, there appears to be no solid justification for pro-
viding funding for a medically necessary abortion for a child, while
not providing such funding for an indigent woman.  They are both es-
sentially in the same position, and because Ireland guarantees the
funding of other medically necessary procedures for indigent adult
women, there appears to be little reason to think that adult women
could not also receive funding in order to travel abroad and termi-
nate their pregnancies.245  Furthermore, the Department of Health
states in its guide to entitlements to health services that, “Persons
may be authorised to receive medical treatment which is considered
necessary and which is not available in Ireland.”246  The health board
must provide authorization for such treatments, but other than the
requirement that the health board establish that the medically neces-
sary procedure is not available anywhere in the country, there seems
to be no limitation in this section that would prevent abortion from
being considered medically necessary.  Therefore, as the law now
stands, it appears that adult women in Ireland who are unable to pay
for a medically necessary abortion may have the State fund such a
procedure, even if it involves traveling outside of Ireland.  If such a
proposition is unpalatable to the Irish people, the legislature should
specifically amend the Health Act, and perhaps the Child Care Act,
to limit the entitlements to health services.
VII.  CONCLUSION
The holding of the Information Bill case, together with the
trends of the courts up to and including the C case, present the peo-
ple of Ireland with the urgent need to decide the future of abortion
law democratically, within a state that is rapidly changing, both in
terms of jurisprudence and demographics.  Natural law theory can no
longer provide the necessary theoretical barrier to the expanding lib-
243. See Health Act, No. 1, § 72(1) (1970).
244. See IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3.
245. Unless the government chose to exclude such funding on the basis of Article 40.3.3.
But, that would also exclude funding of abortions under the Child Care Act, which the C case
specifically authorized.  See C case [1998] 1 I.L.R.M at 480.
246. Department of Health and Children, supra note 235.
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eralization of abortion law in Ireland.  Given the holdings of the Irish
judiciary leading up to and including the C case, only the democratic
process can hold back the flood waters.  For better or worse, Ireland
has lost the strong theoretical tools entrenched in natural law theory
and the government must now face sensitive political topics, such as
abortion, head-on in order to avoid the anti-democratic process of
judicial law-making that has seen its latest realization in the C case.
Amy M. Buckley
